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LEGAL INTERSECTIONS

Adoption Consents:
Legal Incentives for Best Practices
Elizabeth J. Samuels, JD

The Uniform Adoption Act sets out commonly accepted goals of
state adoption laws. Among them are the goals of protecting "minor
children against unnecessary separation from their birth parents" and of
ensuring "that a decision by a birth parent to relinquish a minor child
and consent to the child's adoption is informed and voluntary ."l Yet, as
a Texas judge writing in a contested adoption case observed, his state's
not atypical law provided more safeguards for sophisticated purchasers
of consumer products than it did for young mothers relinquishing their
newborn infants: "Even as the senior justice on this court ... , I am
allowed three days to cancel a contract to purchase consumer goods
signed at my home-a document that is far less important than and a setting that is far more comfortable than a hospital."2
State adoption laws governing domestic infant adoption should, at a
minimum, encourage and provide incentives for all adoption service
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providers to engage in what are considered "best practices" for these
children, their parents, and their prospective adoptive parents. That
many state laws fail to do so is suggested by what one court has refen-ed
to as "the multitude of cases in which a natural parent seeks to regain her
child."3 In the reports of cases involving mothers' attempts to revoke
their consents to the adoption of their newborn infants, attempts which
are almost always unsuccessful, one can usually discern a lack of the
skilled and unbiased counseling that would have provided these mothers with sufficient information and support to make deliberate and final
decisions. 4 Even more starkly, the cases highlight the very short periods
of time foHowing the child's birth after which these mothers' consent
may be given and may become irrevocable. Their consents, typically,
were signed within hours or within a day or two of the birth, and were
just as quickly regretted.
In one recent case, for example, the mother throughout her pregnancy
considered but did not decide upon placing her child for adoption. The
day after the birth, she was still undecided. The following day, when she
was to be released from the hospital and when the agency with which
she had consulted was going to close for the weekend, she authorized
the agency counselor to come to the hospital. The counselor discussed
the mother's situation with her and presented her with the paperwork,
and that evening the adoptive parents left the hospital with the child. In
court, the counselor testified that the mother understood her relinquishment was in-evocable. The mother testified that she had been weak and
tired from not having slept for 24 hours, that she had been affected by
Percocet, the narcotic she was taking for pain, and that she did not recall
whether she was told the consent was irrevocable. At home the next
day, she decided she had made a mistake and, according to her testimony, called but was unable to reach the agency. That evening she
called the prospective adoptive parents to say she had made a mistake
and did not want to place the child for adoption. Approximately 10 days
later, a representative of the agency signed the relinquishment document, giving the agency the power to consent to the adoption. The
mother unsuccessfully sought to set aside her relinquishment in her
state's courts and in a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. s
The state laws that govern consents by mothers of newborn infants
apply to a variety of adoption services providers-public agencies, nonprofit, and for-profit private agencies, lawyers, physicians, and other
"facilitators," "a new breed of adoption entrepreneurs who specialize in
finding pregnant women for prospective parents." Public agencies,
however, principally arrange adoptions of older children and children
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with special needs,6 while most adoptions of domestic newborns are handled by private agencies and by independent, non-agency intermediaries.' Since 1970, according to historian Barbara Melosh, even private
agency adoptions have "declined sharply, in what amounts to a massive
de facto deregulation of child placement."s As Melosh summarizes the
situation, "[A]fter 1970, most placements have been made as private
agreements executed between consenting adults, with minimal involvement from the state."9 With the Internet as "the main catalyst," there has
been a "huge increase" in the number of adoptions in which generally
white couples and birth parents identify one another. lO Reliable statistics are not available on the relative number of private agency versus independent, non-agency adoptions, II but both these types of providers
are subject to limited regulation and operate under a largely "laissez
faire" regime. 12
The "market" in which domestic infant adoptions are arranged is
characterized by high fees, demand for children that outstrips available
supply, and marketing aimed both at prospective adopters and at pregnant women who might consider placing their infants for adoption. In
contrast to the cost of public agency adoptions, which range from zero
to $2,500; the cost of a domestic private agency adoption ranges from
$4,000 to more than $30,000; and the cost of a domestic independent
adoption ranges from $8,000 to more than $30,000, or reportedly to as
much as $50,000. 13 Families that adopt infants tend to have higher incomes than those that adopt older children and children with special
needs. 14 Tax benefits often flow disproportionately to families who
adopt infants domestically and children from other countries, although
the benefits have been promoted as a means of increasing the number of
adoptions of chi ldren out of foster care. 15 Some adoption professionals
and observers argue that all adoptions should be arranged, as they are in
some other countries, only as a social service by public chi1d welfare
agencies or highly regulated nonprofit agencies. 16 In the United States,
only three states limit the placement of children with unrelated adoptive
parents to licensed agencies,17 and even in those states parties can arrange what are in effect independent adoptions by identifying one
another and then using an agency to handle the arrangements. IS
The best practices that characterize ethical and humane infant adoption
services for the mothers of newborn infants, practices that should be
promoted by state adoption laws, include making skHled, unbiased
counseling available to expectant and new mothers. 19 Skilled counseling,
as the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA) explains, helps provide assurance that "[i]nformed decisions will be made." Counseling

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281622

88

ADOPTION QUARTERLY

for prospective birth parents, as explained in a comprehensive guide to
adoption practices, can help parents to "own" their decisions,2o that is,
can help them feel "in control through having a real choice."21 Having
felt as if they had a real choice is a factor associated with "positive resolutions" for birth mothers, as is having an opportunity to talk, to reflect,
and "to anticipate future pain."22
Counseling for mothers should include providing information about
alternatives to adoption, options within adoption, and legal steps and
consequences involved in adoption. Information should be provided
both orally and in writing. As social worker Patricia Roles puts it in a
guide for counselors published by the CWLA, "[o]nly with all the facts
can anyone make a well-thought-out, informed decision. Supplying
written information is most useful because it allows the client to read
and digest the material when she feels ready."23 Information provided
orally may be insufficient because the recipient may be "in a state of
shock or denial and unable to retain all the information."24 Initially, information should be available to pregnant women and new mothers
about what alternatives to adoption are available for the care of their
children, how to determine the support needed if they rear their children,
and how to access the resources they would need. 25 With respect to
adoption, they should have information about and understand available
options, including possible degrees of openness. 26 Mothers should also
receive accurate and clear information about the legal steps involved
and their consequencesP
In addition, mothers should be given information about the ways that
placing a child for adoption may affect the mothers themselves and the
child in both the short and long term. The CWLA standards advise that
"[i]n all instances, birth parents and other family members should receive counseling to help them understand the grief and loss" that they
may experienee. 28 While studies are limited, those that have been conducted "suggest that relinquishment is a very stressful event and that
many mothers are haunted by it for years later."29 The studies constitute
"a growing body of recent research data which have supported the
claims of birth parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound
loss experience, and that this loss even can have long-term deleterious
results."3o With respect to the effects of adoption on the child, as adoption social worker James L. Gritter writes, "[A]dvantages [of adoption
for the child] are accompanied by significant losses ... A pregnant
woman considering adoption for her child needs to consider the ratio
of losses and gains posed by the adoption choice."31 For the adopted
person as well as for the birth and adoptive parents, adoption is now
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thought to be "a lifelong process."32 Psychologist and researcher David
M. Brodzinsky concludes that while "most adopted children appear to
cope quite well with the challenges, conflicts, and demands of adoptive
family life," a review of the limited research available suggests that
"adopted children are at an increased risk for psychological and academic problems in comparison to their non-adopted counterparts."33
Adopted children are thought to face some unique developmental chal-.
lenges. Unlike children raised by their birth parents, "those adopted
have to accomplish or be aided to accomplish a number of additional
psychological tasks, which most of them do successfully."34
Ultimately, of course, the counselor's job is to help the mother make
a difficult decision that often involves "ambivalence and denial."35 For
mothers, as Gritter observes, "Seldom is adoption selected as a true
preference-it almost always involves a pronounced element of necessity. The idea of adoption ... only emerges as a possible outcome when
something is seriously askew."36 Statistics support the observation that
adoption is not a "preferred" option for unmarried pregnant women. Between 1989 and 1995, the percentage of unmarried white women placing children for adoption was approximately 1.7%, and the percentage
for African-American women was even smallerY
Even when counseling is available, there is an inherent troubling potential for imposition of biases and conflicts of interest. Social workers
have a fundamental responsibility to facilitate their clients' self-determination, expand choice and opportunity for all people,38 and, when
necessary, "take reasonable steps to ensure" that their employers' practices are consistent with the National Association of Social Workers
code of ethics. 39 Complicating an adoption counselor's task is the fact
that in a crisis, the counselor has the potential to exercise "immense
power."40 "There are times, especially when frustration runs high, when
the decision-maker would love to have some powerful, decisive person
come along and take the decision out of her hands."41 As Roles points
out in her guide for counselors, if a "young woman must make her own
decision because she has to live with it for the rest of her life," then the
ideal counselor is "a neutral, unbiased [one] who has no vested interest
in the outcomes of her decision."42 She continues, "If a client feels pressured toward any particular choices, a power struggle will result where
the client will be forced to defend her position, rather than consider all
the options."43
Counselors, agency officials, and intermediaries, of course, may have
strong biases based on their own philosophical, religious, or social views.
They may favor family preservation, regardless of the circumstances, or
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they may believe adoption is invariably the best option when a mother is
unmarried or has limited economic and social support. Another factor
that can affect the neutrality of counseling is the conflict that arises from
one entity's providing services to birth parents and adoptive parents
simultaneously. It is natural for service providers to attend to the clients
who are paying for the services-the prospective adoptive parents,44 and it
is easier for many providers to sympathize with the adoptive parents, who
are usually more established in life and may have struggled to conceive a
child. The support and advocacy group Concerned United Birthparents
advises pregnant women and new mothers not to expect that an agency or
a pregnancy counselor "wlll have only your best interest in mind. They do
not, and they cannot. Adoption agencies, like it or not, have to make
money to operate. The paying client is the adoptive parent, so services are
usually geared toward them."45
.
With respect to bes t practices and the timi ng of mothers' consent to
the adoption of their newborn infants, there is nearly universal agreement that an expectant mother should not consent to adoption before the
birth because she cannot be sure of what her feelings will be after the
child is born.46 Reportedly, some one half of the women who believe
they have settled on adoption change their minds after the birth.47 The
Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "[e ]xperience has evidenced a host
of cases in which a mother plans to give her unborn child to adoptive
parents, only to change her mind after going through child birth and the
resulting mother-child attachment."48 The guide for counselors published by the CWLA advises counselors to make sure birth parents understand that they are the child's legal parents. "This means that they
can see, hold, feed, or care for their baby. The level of contact is up to
them. Many young people feel intimidated by those in authority and
might not realize that they have these choices."49
Author Adam Pertman, now executive director of the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, reports that "[b]irth mothers typically want to
spend time with their babies, and virtually all mental-health and social-work professionals advise them to do so. Some just hold their children for a few minutes, while others need days or weeks."5o The birth
parents' organization CUB contends that women who sign irrevocable
consents in the hospital shortly after birth are "rushed into signing without a chance to process all of the information."51 CUB categorically advises women, "[N]ever sign papers in the hospital ... Adoption is a
serious matter, one that should be finalized only in a courtroom or a legal
environment, not a recovery bed."52 Infants, of course, can be placed in
the custody of their prospective adoptive parents as soon as the parties
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feel confident that the birth parents are unlikely to change their minds.
For example, a number of agencies in Scotland place newborns directly
from the hospital even though the mother has six weeks to change her
mind, "provided the mother's decision about the future of her baby
seem[s] final."s3
Laws in slightly more than half the states address the issue of counseling services for mothers considering placing their newborn infants for
adoption, and all state laws regulate the timing of these mothers' consents. With respect to counseling, 10 states require counseling for birth
parents in some or in alI adoptions. Some of those states specify requisite amounts of counseling and some specify the timing of the counseling. Twenty states have statutory requirements that birth parents in
some or all types of adoptions be made aware of the fact that counseling
is available, with two states specifying counseling by a licensed adoption agency. Only a handful of these states specify how much counseling should be offered or mandate the counselor's qualifications or
affiliations. 54
With respect to the timing of consents, the state laws that currently
govern mothers' consents to the adoption of their newborn infants vary
widely but fall into a few basic types. As a general rule, consents may be
set aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usually for limited periods oftime after consent has been given or after the
adoption has been granted. In the absence of such wrongdoing, which is
difficult to establish,ss mothers in many states are afforded a limited opportunity to revoke their consent. The state laws governing consent folIowa number of different patterns. Under a few states' laws, mothers
may sign consents before the birth but then have a brief period of time
after the birth to revoke them. Under some state laws, consents may be
signed any time after the birth and are then revocable for a specified period. Under other state laws, consents may not be signed until a specified number of hours or days after birth and are then revocable for a
specified period. A different group of state laws provides that irrevocable consents may be signed at any time after birth. Other state laws provide that irrevocable consents may be signed after a specified number of
hours or days following birth.56 In contrast to the laws in many other
countries, including a majority of European countries and Australian
states in which consent may not be given or does not become final for a
period of approximately six weeks,s7 in approximately half the U.S.
states the mother's irrevocable consent can be established iii as short a
period as less than four days after birth; in approximat~ly 10% of the
states, it can be established in less than seven days afl.er birth; and in
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approximately 15% of the states, it can be established in less than two
weeks after birth.58
Given that the availability of counseling is an essential aspect of best
practices, there is at least potential utility in requirements that a number of
counseling sessions be available, that the sessions be with a licensed social worker or therapist, and that the sessions be available both well in advance of giving consent and after consent has been given. But, as
suggested earlier, first, it is very difficult to ensure that counseling will be
skilled and unbiased and, second, there are risks of conflicts of interest
when the counseling is offered or arranged by the agency or individual
handling the adoption, as well as when it is offered by other providers but
nevertheless paid for by the prospective adoptive parents. California attempts to minimize, but does not eliminate, this risk by requiring that prospective birth parents in independent adoptions be advised of their rights
and offered three separate counseling sessions by an "adoption service
provider," defined as a licensed agency or a licensed clinical social
worker with five years of relevant experience. The counselor who advises
the birth parents must not have any "contractual relationship with the
adoptive parents, an attorney for the adoptive parents, or any other individual or ... organization perfonning any type of services for the adoptive parents and for which the adoptive parents are paying a fee, except as
relates" to the fee for the counseling. 59 When a state attempts to regulate
counselors' qualifications, services, and affiliations in this way, or itself
provides counseling services, the state imposes or incurs substantial
costs, a fact that helps explain why other states have not adopted such
measures and why they are unlikely to do so. Similarly, increased costs
and potential delays make it unlikely many states will consider joining
the 10 states that require another means of ensuring decisions are made
freely and voluntarily. These states require that the mothers in some or all
independent adoptions appear in court to relinquish parental rights or give
their consent, a procedure recommended as a key, if imperfect, safeguard
by adoption law scholar Joan Heifetz Hollinger,60 and a procedure the efficacy of which suggested by a relative paucity of reported disputes in
which the procedure was employed.
With respect to the laws governing the timing of consents as well as
the provision of counseling, it is possible to create powerful incentives
for adoption service providers to follow best practices. As state laws
provide in the very different context of consumer contracts, laws can
provide effective information requirements and consent timing rules. At
very low cost, states can, and some states do, require that specific
information be provided at specified times, orally and in ~pecific written
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formats, and that provision and receipt of the information be confirmed
in writing. For example, Vermont has enacted the Uniform Adoption
Act (1994) which requires, among other things, that (1) a parent "shall
have been informed of the meaning and consequences of adoption" and
"the availability of personal and legal counseling"; (2) the person before
whom the consent or relinquishment is executed must certify both that
he or she orally explained the contents and consequences of executing
the document and that the person signing the consent read or was read
the document and was offered a copy; and (3) the consent contain "specific instructions as to how to revoke the consent or relinquishment."61
Even more effective than information requirements, and equally
practicable, are rules that prohibit giving hasty irrevocable consents.
Such rules require no or only modest expenditures. In the period after
birth and before consent is final, an infant may be cared for by the
mother, the father, or both parents, either independently or with assistance, or by foster parents. While foster care before placement is
disfavored compared with care by the baby's mother,62 no research or
historical experience suggests that a period of a few days to a few weeks
in foster care adversely affects newborn babies who, then, return to their
birth families or move into secure adoptive placements, In domestic
adoptions in the past, many children were kept in care for six to nine
months before placement in an effort to insure their physical and mental
fitness. 63 In any event, such speedy consents are not necessary for early
placements into adoptive homes. As discussed earlier, if a child's parents and the prospective adoptive parents are confident that the parents'
decisions are final, and if they aU wish for an early placement, the
child's parents can place the child in the adoptive home before consent
has been given or becomes final. 64 Speedy consents are also unnecessary to ensure suitable adoptive placements for children, given the great
demand for healthy newborns.
Prohibiting hasty consents creates incentives for service providers to
follow best practices in adoption. When a mother who has tentatively
agreed to adoption subsequently decides not to place her child, service
providers and prospective adoptive parents face potentially great costs,
financial and emotional. The chance the mother will change her mind is
greatest if she has been inadequately counseled or improperly pressured
but then is afforded adequate time to consider and to reconsider her decision. Therefore, if hasty consents are not permitted, all adoption services
providers and prospective adoptive parents have a powerful incentive to
follow best practices from the outset. In other words, prohibiting hasty
consents promotes best practices among those wbo might be tempted to
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disregard them-whether for philosophical, religious, emotional, or finaneial reasons-in order to meet the compelling desires of prospective adoptive parents.
The most advantageous laws provide both a period of time after birth
before which consent may be given and a subsequent period of time for
revocation. Mothers who feel they have sufficiently deliberated and
firmly decided on adoption may give their legal consent not long after
birth and then choose to neither entertain nor exercise their right to revoke. They may "walk away," knowing that the adoption will be completed without further participation on their part. For mothers in less
favorable circumstances, the revocation period offers an opportunity for
reflection as they recover from giving birth and begin to experience the
effects that the decision will have on themselves and their families. To
determine the optimal periods of time, there is no magic formula that
perfectly balances the need for deliberate decisions with the need to establish children in their permanent homes. If the period before a mother
may consent is three to seven days, most mothers will be out of the hospital, free of the strongest effects of medication, and probably more sensible of their right not to place their children despite any tentative
arrangements made before birth. If the subsequent, unqualified revocation period is approximately three weeks, the total period of approximately four weeks will still be shorter than in many other countries and
shorter than the postpartum period of six to eight weeks between birth
and the time when the mother's body has returned as closely as possible
to its pre-pregnant state. 65 It may, nevertheless, be long enough for most
mothers to recover from the etIeets of childbirth and long enough
for counteraeting to some extent any lack of adequate information or
supportive counseling.
Infant adoptions are momentous, life-altering events, not only for the
child and both sets of parents, but also for the extended families. We cannot predict how a child's personality, interests, and talents will mesh with
those of either the child's birth or adoptive parents and siblings, or how a
child will respond to having been placed for adoption. We cannot know
what opportunities a family will enjoy and what challenges it will face.
When a state places its legal imprimatur on the unmaking of one family
and the making of another, the state should at least insure to the greatest
extent possible that aU the individuals involved have followed or have
been afforded the best practices that ethics and humanity demand. For
mothers considering placing their children for adoption, skilled, unbiased
counseling is invaluable; complete, well-communicated information is
indispensable; and time is, perhaps, "the wisest counselor of al1."66
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